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Recent Developments
DAMAGES - Measure Of Recovery For Partial Destruction
Of Automobile. Taylorv. King, 241 Md. 50, 213 A.2d 504 (1965). In
an action to recover for damages to his automobile, the plaintiff, who
alleged that the automobile could not by repair be restored to substan-
tially its pre-accident condition, sought and recovered damages meas-
ured by the difference between the value of his automobile immediately
before and after the accident.'
Claiming that the automobile could have been restored to its former
condition, the defendant contended that the true measure of damages
was the cost of repair. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals
remanded the case for a determination as to whether the damaged
automobile could reasonably have been restored by repair to substan-
tially its pre-accident condition.
In so remanding the case, the Court of Appeals stated that:
Until now, we have not had to consider a case in which there
was a possibility that the injured automobile could not be restored
to its prior condition . . . [but] it [is] clear that the rule in
Maryland with respect to the measure of damages for injury to a
motor vehicle, which has not been entirely destroyed, is the
reasonable cost of the repairs necessary to restore it to substan-
tially the same condition that it was in before the injury, provided
the cost of repairs is less than the diminution in the market value
due to the injury. And when the cost of restoring the motor
vehicle to substantially the same condition is greater than the
diminution in the market value the measure of damages is the
difference between its market value immediately before and imme-
diately after the injury.2
It is generally agreed that the object of awarding damages is to
compensate the injured party for his loss, that is ". . [to make] him
1. The plaintiff had purchased his automobile at a cost of $3192.49 two months
prior to the accident in which it was damaged. At the time of the accident the market
value of the automobile was $3127.43. The estimated cost of fully repairing it was
$1118.21; its value as salvage was $975. The trial court award of $2182.43 was
obtained by subtracting the salvage value from the market value at the time of the
accident and adding a $30 towing charge. Taylor v. King, 241 Md. 50, 51, 213 A.2d
504, 505 (1965).
2. Taylor v. King, 241 Md. 50, 54, 213 A.2d 504, 507 (1965). In formulating
this rule, the Court relied on Fisher v. City Dairy Co., 137 Md. 601, 113 Atd. 95(1921) ; Washington B. and A. Ry. v. Fingles, 135 Md. 574, 109 Atl. 431 (1920);
Western Maryland R.R. v. Martin, 110 Md. 554, 73 Atl. 267 (1909) ; Mullan v.
Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 49 A.2d 640 (1946). The first three decisions applied the rule
that the proper measure of damages in the case of injured chattels is the cost of
repair. In the Mullan case, the Court said that "the measure of damages for property
is the cost of restoring it, if it can be restored to the condition it was in before the
injury; but where the cost of restoring it is greater than the diminution in the market
value, the correct measure is the difference between the value of the property before
the injury and after." Mullan v. Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 270, 49 A.2d 640, 644 (1946).
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whole as nearly as that may be done by an award of money."'3 In cases
where an automobile is completely destroyed 4 or reduced to salvage,5
it is clear that an award measured by the value of the automobile at
the time of the injury less any salvage value adequately compensates
the injured party. Where, as in the instant case, an automobile is
only partially destroyed, the courts have established diverse rules for
measuring damages. Some courts award damages based on the cost of
repairs necessary to restore the automobile to substantially its pre-
injury condition.' Damages calculated on this basis adequately com-
pensate an injured party only if the repaired automobile closely approxi-
mates its pre-injury market value.' To avoid this unjust situation, some
courts measure damages by the cost of repairs and then adjust this
amount in such a way that the final award will equal the market value
of the automobile prior to its injury.' Most courts, however, measure
damages by the diminution in the market value of the injured automo-
bile, 9 but generally place some emphasis on the cost of repairs as
evidence of the diminution in value, ° whether such repairs had actually
been made before trial" or not. 2 In rare instances, damages are meas-
ured by the diminution formula or by the cost of repairs at the
plaintiff's option, subject to the restriction that the cost of repairs must
not exceed the diminution in market value. 1 3 In none of these situations
is the injured party obligated to actually make repairs; however, in
those jurisdictions which measure damages by the cost of repairs, if the
evidence reveals that the injured automobile is susceptible of repair,
that will be the measure of damages.' 4 Furthermore, in some jurisdic-
3. James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582, 583 (1956).
4. E.g., Bailey v. Ford, 151 Md. 664, 135 Atl. 835 (1927); Southern County
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Green Motor Co., 248 S.W.2d 959 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
5. E.g., Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R. v. Hadley Auto Transport, 216
F. Supp. 94 (D. Colo. 1963); Sawyer v. Monarch Cab Co., 164 A.2d 340 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1960).
6. E.g., Sanft v. Haisfield Ford, Inc., 197 Pa. Super. 447, 178 A.2d 791 (1962).
Courts which measure damages by the cost of repair often specify that in addition
to restoring the automobile to substantially its pre-injury condition, the repairs must
be made at reasonable cost. See Tinney v. Williams, 144 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940). Neither may they exceed the diminution in the market value of the automo-
bile due to its injury nor its value prior to the injury. Knox v. Akowskej', 116 A.2d
406 (D.C. Mun. App. 1955) ; Gass v. Agate Ice Cream, Inc., 246 N.Y. 141, 190 N.E.323 (1934). See generally McCORMACK, DAMAGES § 124 (1935) ; Annot., 169 A.L.R.
1100 (1947) ; James, supra note 3.
7. See James, supra note 3, at 595.
8. E.g., Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W.2d 824 (1945); Chicago, R.I. and
G. Ry. v. Zumalt, 239 S.W. 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). See generally James, srupra
note 3, at 594; McCORMACK, op. cit. supra note 6, § 124.
9. E.g., Alber v. Wise, 166 A.2d 141 (Del. 1960) ; Urquhart v. Marty, 61 R.I.
102, 200 At. 456 (1938).
10. E.g., Littlejohn v. Eliansky, 130 Conn. 541, 36 A.2d 52 (1944) ; Teitsworth v.
Kerpski, 127 A.2d 237 (Del. 1956). See generally James, supra note 3, at 593;
MCCORMACK, op. cit. supra note 6, § 124.
11. E.g., Foshee v. McGee, 87 So. 2d 754 (La. 1956).
12. E.g., United States F. & G. Co. v. P and F Motor Express, 220 N.C. 721,
18 S.E.2d 116 (1942).
13. Folter v. City of Toledo, 196 Ohio St. 238, 158 N.E.2d 893 (1959);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 928(a) (1939). See Panilli v. Brooklyn City R.R., 236 App.
Div. 577, 260 N.Y.S. 60 (1932). For a discussion of the merits of this approach, see
James, supra note 3, at 595.
14. E.g., Sanft v. Haisfield Ford, 197 Pa. Super. 447, 178 A.2d 792, at 793 (1964).
But see Foster v. Humburg, 180 Kan. 64, 299 P.2d 46 (1956).
1966]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tions, if the automobile has been fully repaired, any recovery is limited
to the cost of those repairs, if they are shown to have been reasonable. 15
The Maryland rule stated in the Taylor case awards damages
based either the diminution in market value or the cost of repairs,
whichever amount is lower.'" Though faithful to prior Maryland
cases on damages,17 this rule, by limiting recovery (where an automo-
bile is repairable) to the cost of repairs without consideration of
whether the market value of the repaired automobile is more or less
than its pre-injury market value, can in some situations leave injured
parties to some extent uncompensated for their losses. Of course,
this result would be avoided if the standard of whether an automobile
is repairable includes returning it to substantially the same market
value, but there is no indication in the Maryland cases that repairable
means more than restorable in function and appearance. The possible
prejudice of the used car market against repaired vehicles seems to be
ignored. However, the Maryland rule may be justifiable on the basis
of judicial convenience since it avoids speculative inquiries as to
market value after repair.
DEAD BODIES - The Right Of Sepulchre. Bonilla v. Reeves,
267 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966). In 1958, decedent sustained a fractured
skull after falling from a truck while in the course of his employ-
ment. He died in May, 1960, at which time a Dr. Thomas per-
formed an autopsy under authorization of the County Coroner, but
without the permission of any of decedent's relatives. Upon the re-
quest of the neurosurgeon who originally examined the decedent,
the brain was removed and given to him for purposes of examination.
The body was buried without the brain, which the neurosurgeon had
never returned. In 1962 the mother of decedent's natural child brought
an action in the child's behalf as the child's guardian against the em-
ployer and the neurosurgeon for damages for mental distress based on
the violation of the right of sepulchre.' Dr. Thomas, who was not a
15. E.g., Gambrell v. Audobon Ins. Co., 115 So. 2d 727 (La. 1959); Santos v.
Sharz, 87 Cal. App. 758, 262 Pac. 764 (1927).
16. In taking this position, the Maryland court is among influential judicial
company. See Lewis v. Adams, 18 Misc. 2d 393, 193 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1959) ; Santos v.
Sharz, 87 Cal. App. 758, 262 Pac. 764 (1927). For a critique of this view, see James,
supra note 3, at 595-96.
17. See note 2 supra.
1. The right of sepulchre was not part of the early English common law, because
prior to the 16th century burial of bodies was governed solely by the church and the
ecclesiastical courts. Even after the power of ecclesiastical law declined, English law
was slow to recognize the right of an individual to bring action against one who inter-
fered with or mutilated a corpse. "But though the heir has a property in the monu-
ments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor
can he bring civil action against such as indecently at least, if not impiously, violate
and disturb their remains, when dead and buried." 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 429
(Lewis ed. 1900).
For a complete discussion of the development of the right of sepulchre, see
JACKSON , LAW O1 CADAVERS ch. II (1937) ; Note, Property in Corpses, 5 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 280 (1958).
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party, appeared as a witness for the plaintiff. The trial court found
as a matter of law that the child was too young to suffer such damage,
and on the matter of punitive damages the jury returned a verdict for
defendants. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.'
In this subsequent action the child sued Dr. Thomas for damages
to her feelings and for mental distress arising from the Doctor's removal
of decedent's brain, and the decedent's father sued Dr. Thomas, the
neurosurgeon, and the workmen's compensation insurer on the same
grounds. Ruling on the motions of both parties for summary judgment,
the court denied plaintiff's motion and denied defendants' motion to
dismiss the charges made by the father, while dismissing the child's suit
on grounds of collateral estoppel.
One of the earliest cases in this country to recognize the right of
a relative in a decedent's body was Larson v. Chase.' This is a qualified
property right, a legal right to possession of the body for the purpose
of preservation and burial.4 A Vermont court stated that this was a
correlative right arising out of the duty of the nearest relatives to bury
their dead and specifically included the right to have the corpse in the
same condition at burial as when death occurred.5 Interference with
this right by mutilating or disturbing the body is therefore an action-
able wrong.6
It follows, then, that the person with the duty to bury the corpse,
the spouse or nearest adult next-of-kin, may bring this action,7 which is
based on violation of the individual's qualified property right.' Dam-
2. Chapparo v. Jackson 6 Perkins Co., 346 F.2d 677 (1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 931 (1965).
3. 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
4. A Rhode Island court termed the right "quasi-property." Pierce v. Proprie-
tors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872). Many courts have adopted this
terminology. Quasi-property does not imply full ownership rights and thus avoids
abuses, such as sale of corpses, which could result from classifying a corpse as per-
sonal property. The right is limited narrowly to possession of the body only for the
purpose of preparation for burial. Note, Property in Corpses, 5 ST. Louis U.L.J. 280,
289 (1958). The court in Larson v. Chase did not discuss whether a dead body was
property in the ordinary commercial sense, but stated that since an individual has
the right to possession of a body for purposes of burial, the inevitable conclusion is
that it ". . . is his property in the broadest and most general sense of that term
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891).
5. Nichols v. Vermont Central Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 109 Atl. 905, 906 (1919). See
JACKSON, THE LAW op CADAVERS ch. III (1937), where a distinction is made between
the duty to bury the body, which arises out of an individual's right to be buried after
death, and the privilege of possession and control of the body in preparation for
burial. Generally, the same individual has both the duty and the privilege.
6. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891). Such interference
includes failure to return removed organs to the body prior to burial. Consent given
for performance of an autopsy implies permission for the autopsy to be conducted in
the usual manner, which may include removal of organs for miscroscopic examination.
Winkler v. Hawkes & Ackley, 126 Iowa 474, 102 N.W. 418 (1905). However, any
permission given contemplates retention of the organs for only as long as is reason-
ably necessary for an examination. Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358,
359 (S.D. Cal. 1933).
7. Steagall v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 171 F.2d 352, 353 (1948). See JACKSON,
TH4 LAW oi" CADAVERS ch. VI (1938), for a complete discussion of the nature of the
action, who may bring it, and damages.
8. Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981, 984 (1937).
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ages, which are generally compensatory (although punitive damages
may be awarded also), 9 have two bases: (1) violation of the qualified
property right, and (2) the mental suffering of the plaintiff. The
former is seldom enunciated in the cases, although it seems to be a
clear basis of liability since it is the foundation of the cause of action."0
Although compensatory damages for violation of a property right are
usually measured by the difference in the reasonable or market value
of the property before and after the wrong was committed," it is
obvious that with regard to mutilation of corpses such damages are
difficult to assess. For this reason most courts have allowed, as the
stated grounds of recovery, principally the mental suffering on the
basis that such mental suffering was the direct consequence of the
willful, wanton, or malicious violation of the qualified property right.12
One court has stated, however, that violation of the right to have re-
turned to the body an organ which has been removed gives rise to
nominal damages only.'3
In Maryland, the right of the surviving spouse or next-of-kin to
custody of the body in preparation for burial has been termed a "quasi-
property" right.'4 The only Maryland case concerning mutilation of a
corpse is Young v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Baltimore
City, 5 the facts of which are similar to those in the principal case.'"
This case gives little direct information on recovery for violation of the
right of sepulchre in Maryland since plaintiff was denied recovery on
statutory grounds. 7 It does indicate, however, that in Maryland the
scope of recovery for this tort is strictly limited by statute.' 8  Statutes
9. Grawunder v. Beth Israel Hospital Ass'n, 242 App. Div. 56, 272 N.Y.S. 171,
177 (1934).
10. "It is also elementary that while the law as a general rule only gives com-
pensation for actual injury, yet whenever the . . . invasion of a legal right is estab-
lished, the law infers damage, and if no evidence is given of any particular amount of
loss, it declares the right by awarding nominal damages." Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn.
307, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891).
11. Mullan v. Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 49 A.2d 640, 644 (1946).
12. Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981 (1937) ; Kirksey v. Hernigan,
45 So. 2d 188, 189 (1950); Beller v. City of New York, 269 App. Div. 642, 58
N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (1945) ; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238, 239-40 (1891).
See also RnSTATXMENT, TORTS § 868 (1939), which provides: "A person who
wantonly mistreats the body of a dead person or who without privilege intentionally
removes, withholds or operates on the dead body is liable to the member of the family
of such person who is entitled to the disposition of the body." The basis of the cause
of action is primarily plaintiff's mental suffering caused by the defendant's action;
there is liability even though the only damage is injury to the plaintiff's feelings caused
by knowledge of the defendant's conduct. Plaintiff may also recover damages for
physical harm which resulted from the mental suffering caused. RESTAThI MNT,
TORTS § 868, comments a and b (1939).
13. Gray v. Southern Pacific Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1937).
Contra, Palmquist v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358, 359 (S.D. Cal. 1933).
14. Painter v. United States F.&G. Co., 123 Md. 301, 91 Atl. 158, 160 (1914).
15. 81 Md. 358, 32 Atl. 177 (1895).
16. For additional detail concerning the facts of the principal case, see Chaparro
v. Jackson & Perkins Co., 346 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1965).
17. BALTIMORE CITY CODE art. 42, § 2 (1892), required a certificate stating the
cause of death of anyone dying in the city, and art. 23, §§ 1, 6 and 7, authorized a
post mortem examination by the Coroner when the cause of death was unknown.
18. MD. CODE ANN. art. 22, §§ 6, 7 (1957), apply now to Baltimore City and the
counties and prescribe the types of deaths which are to be investigated and for which
[VOL. XXVI
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regulating the duties of medical examiners have the effect of limiting
the scope of recovery for violation of the right of sepulchre by pre-
scribing certain spheres of action in which the examiner's or his au-
tiorized representative's treatment of a corpse is privileged,' 9 to the
extent that such treatment is not a wanton or malicious abuse of the
privilege.2"
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Maryland courts would
allow recovery for mental distress arising from an unprivileged viola-
tion of the right to sepulchre. Recovery for mental suffering has been
allowed in personal injury cases21 and in cases in which the nervous
shock resulted in a clearly apparent physical injury.22 In Young v.
College of Physicians and Surgeons, the plaintiff's allegation of dam-
age included "great mental excitement and distress and bodily suffer-
ing" ;23 defendants' demurrers to the declaration on the basis that the
facts alleged did not constitute a cause of action were overruled by the
trial court. The appellate court did not deal with this point, however,
since the jury had found that defendants' actions were within the sphere
of privilege afforded by the statute. A later decision, State v. Balti-
more,24 however, cited the appropriate section of C.J.S. and an Alabama
case concerning mental distress as a proper element of damages when
the distress is the result of a malicious violation of an individual's prop-
erty right. 5 While these stand as dictum only, the indication might be
that in the case of mutilation of a corpse in a willful, wanton, or
malicious abuse of the privilege given a medical examiner by statute,
damages would be allowed for mental suffering. The dictum of another
case, Maloof v. U. S.,26 may also be indicative of the possibility that
Maryland courts would allow recovery for mental suffering in violation
of property right cases. Plaintiff sued for fire damage to his trees and
autopsies may be performed by the Medical Examiner without the permission of
decedent's relatives.
19. MD. CoDe ANN. art. 22, § 6 (1957), when death is the result of violence,
suicide, casualty, or occurs suddenly when person is in apparent health, or is un-
attended by a physician, or occurs in any suspicious or unusual manner.
20. The jury in Young v. College of Physicians and Surgeons were instructed to
find for the defendant Coroner unless they found that he had acted wantonly, malici-
ously or corruptly in conducting the autopsy. 81 Md. 358, 32 Atl. 177, 178 (1895).
21. Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 99 (1883).
22. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atd. 182, 184 (1933) ; Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
23. Young v. College of Physicians and Surgeons, 81 Md. 358, 32 Atl. 177 (1895).
24. 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951) (widow sues for damages for death of hus-
band caused by nervous upset and emotional strain which resulted in a heart attack,
when he saw his property damaged).
25. Id. at 18, quoting: ". . . under ordinary circumstances there can be no
recovery for mental anguish suffered by plaintiff in connection with an injury to his
property. Where, however, the act occasioning the injury is inspired by fraud, malice
or like motives, mental suffering is a proper element of damage." 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 69 (1966). "Nervous reactions naturally are in the same category as those which
are mental, as the result of a tort which is merely an injury to property or its posses-
sion, as distinguished from one to the person. Unless it is committed under circum-
stances of insult or contumely, such reactions are not considered ... as proper elements
of damages." B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hughes, 239 Ala. 373, 194 So. 842, 847 (1940).
26. 242 F. Supp. 175 (Dist. Md. 1965).
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included as an element of damage loss of aesthetic value and personal
disappointment. The court stated that "where an adequate award has
been made for a reasonable restoration, the wronged party may [not]
obtain as an additional element of his damages an amount for sub-
jectively measurable loss of aesthetic appreciation."' '27 By negative
implication, it could be said that since adequate compensatory damages
are difficult, if not impossible, to assess for violation of the right of
sepulchre, Maryland courts would allow recovery with mental suffering
as the primary basis of damages.
LIABILITY INSURANCE - "Defense Coverage" And "No-
Action" Clauses Not A Bar To Subcontractor's Recovery Of Money
Withheld By Government. L. G. Simon v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
353 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1965). Plaintiff subcontracted with the general
contractor on a government construction project to do electrical work in
the process of which the plaintiff's employees made an error which re-
sulted in a fire causing extensive damage to several buildings. The gov-
ernment, through its contracting officer withheld $32,247.82 damages
from the general contractor,1 and the contractor in turn withheld
$7,886.83 from the subcontractor. The assured subcontractor, having
earlier given full notice of the occurrence and the possibility of the re-
sultant claim, formally requested the insurer to participate with the con-
tractor in administratively and judicially challenging the government's
claim and retention. The defendant declined on the basis that no suit had
been filed against the insured.2 The subcontractor then authorized the
contractor and its attorneys to act on its behalf and agreed to share
costs and attorneys' fees. The general contractor, after having ex-
hausted its administrative remedies, instituted suit on the contract
against the government. The Court of Claims rendered judgment
against the contractor based on a finding that the negligence of the
27. Id. at 185.
1. 31 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1954) requires the General Accounting Office to settle and
adjust all claims against the United States and this requirement has been held to allow
the G.A.O. to withhold payments to contractors. See United States v. American Sur.
Co. of N.Y., 158 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1946).
The practice of allowing the government contracting officer to initiate the off-
setting procedures on monies due to the contractor has been declared valid where the
government's claim arises from a transaction independent of the contract. United
States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947). But see Assignment of Claims
Act of 1940, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1954) and 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1965) for limitations on
this right.
See also PAUL, UNITED STATEs GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS
546-48 (1964).
2. The "Defense Coverage" provision of the policy stated in point that "as
respects the insurance afforded by the terms of this policy, the company shall: defend
and suit against the insured alleging . . .destruction and seeking damages on account
thereof . .". 353 F.2d at 611 n.9.
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subcontractor caused the destruction.3 Plaintiff then brought this
action for a declaratory judgment with respect to coverage on the
general liability policy issued by the defendant in order to be reimbursed
for the funds lost as a result of the money withheld by the government
and the general contractor.
The insurer's disclaimer of liability was based on its contentions
that because there was no "suit against the insured", the "Defense
Coverage" clause4 relieved it of any obligation to participate in the
litigation" and that the "No-Action" clause6 precluded any liability
since there was no "judgment against the insured". In holding for the
plaintiff, the court rejected both of these contentions, stating:
A suit is against an assured when, in a judicial proceeding to
which he is party (or deemed by the law to be a party), a definable
claim or contention is asserted that the assured has a legal
liability .... Similarly, it is a judgment against an assured where,
in such a situation, the tribunal renders an enforceable decree
adjudging that the assured has a legal obligation to pay, reimburse
or bear, the loss sustained by the third party.'
The court then held that the subcontractor had, in effect, been
party to the contractor's unsuccessful proceeding against the govern-
3. Douglas Bros., Inc. v. United States, 319 F.2d 872 (United States Court
of Claims, 1963).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Generally, the insurer's duty to defend an action against its insured is a
separate obligation from the duty to pay judgments, and, while the former may be
broader than the ultimate liability of the insurer, it has been held that the insurer
must defend any action where, if liability is established, the insurer would be liable,
even where there is a "No-Action" clause in the policy. See generally 7A APPELMAN,
INSURANCs LAW AND PRAcTIC" §§ 4682, 4684-85 (1962). The majority of juris-
dictions hold that the allegations of the complaint alone determine the insurer's duty
to defend, but there is a trend towards the minority view that the insurer also has an
obligation to independently determine whether there is a possible liability arising out
of the action, and if so, there is an obligation to so defend. See generally 7A APPEL-
MAN §§ 4683-84; 29 Am. JuR. Insurance §§ 1452-53 (1940) ; Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458(1956) ; 65 W. VA. L. tv. 175 (1963); 1965 INS. L.J. 651-55. Where, however,
the insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend a suit, it has been uniformly held that the
insured may be entitled to reimbursement from the insurer for any settlement made
in good faith and for the expenses incurred in his defense of the litigation, and the
insurer will be barred from invoking the provision of the "No-Action" clause. See
generally 7A APPALMAN §§ 4690-91; Annot., 142 A.L.R. 809, 812 (1943); Annot.,
71 A.L.R. 1457 (1931); Annot., 49 A.L.R2d 691 (1927); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 326, 328(1926); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 730, 738 (1925); 29A Am. JUR. Insurance §§ 1448-70
(1960).
6. The clause stated in full:
"11. Action Against Company
No action shall lie against the company unless as a condition precedent
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all terms of this policy, nor
until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally deter-
mined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written
agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the company." 353 F.2d at 612 n.11.
See generally Annot., 159 A.L.R. 762 (1945), for annotation on the validity,
construction and application of No-Action clauses; 29A Am. JUR. Insurance§ 1495 (1960). For these and other standardized clauses in liability policies, see
4 RICHARDS, INSURANCM 2104, 2108 (1952).
7. 353 F.2d at 612.
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ment,8 and that the losses sustained as a result of that decision were
within the coverage of the liability policy.9
Where a claim arising from the insured's alleged liability will
necessarily or probably be adjudicated in a binding fashion by some
other means than a regular judicial proceeding,'" the coverage of an
insurance policy by which the insured contracted to protect himself
from liability for his negligence, would be rendered illusory if recovery
was denied. Thus, attempts to deny liability under the No-Action
clause have been declared invalid where an adjudication of the con-
tractor's liability and an award of damages have been made by the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals" or by arbitration pro-
ceedings under a compulsory arbitration clause in the contract between
the general and subcontractors. 12
Similarly, other courts have held that the mere fact that the
liability of the insured is adjudicated by a somewhat circuitous proce-
dure should not be allowed to defeat the coverage of the policy through
a strict interpretation of the No-Action clause.'" Thus, recovery has
been allowed on the liability policy in various circumstances where a
third party has a derivative liability as a result of the assured's negli-
gence."4 It has also been held that the No-Action clause does not
8. The substance of the court's holding was that the insurer and the subcontrac-
tor were bound under the principles of collateral estoppel by the decision of the
tribunal which adjudicated the liability, 353 F.2d at 612, citing Bros., Inc. v. W. E.
Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1958), where a non-party who participated
in the defense of a patent infringement suit was held to be bound by the judgment of
the prior action and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Gainsville National Bank,
124 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1941), holding that the plaintiff was bound by an earlier judg-
ment in which it was not a party but which was in effect for its benefit.
See JAM-s, CIVIL PROCMDURe- § 11.27, at 590 (1965): "A person not named as a
party may in fact take over the control of an action ... Where he does so to protect
some financial or proprietory interest that he has in the judgment or in the trans-
action or occurrence giving rise to the action, he will be bound by the determination
of fact or law involved in the judgment according to the rules of collateral estoppel..."
9. In American Cas. Co. v. Timmons, 352 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1965), on a
similar fact situation, it was held that a contractor's liability insurer could not invoke
a defense under the "No-Action" clause of the policy when the government withheld
money on the contract for damages caused by the negligence of the contractor and the
claim was adjudicated through administrative and judicial proceedings instituted by
the insured, but taken over and controlled by the insurer.
10. It has been held that a contractor's failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies may result in a denial of his right to a judicial remedy in the Court of
Claims. United States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946).
11. Corbetta Constr. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 375, 247
N.Y.S.2d 288 (1964).
12. Medawick Contracting Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E.2d
520 (1954) ; Cross Properties, Inc. v. The Home Indem. Co., 246 N.Y.S. 683, 41 Misc.
2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
13. See generally 5 CoucH, CYCLOPMDIA OF INSURANcE LAW § 1165(b), at pp.
4136-37 (1960) which states:
[Plublic liability policies ordinarily are not confined to, and do not con-
template, indemnity only against direct actions by injured persons against the
insured; rather, they cover losses which he may suffer by reason of being liable
over to another who has been compelled to pay for damages to persons injured
because of the negligence or wrongful act of the insured, or his agents, which
resulted in such injuries being inflicted. In other words, the insured may sustain
a loss from liability to the public on account of personal injuries caused by them,
or their workmen, and such loss be brought within the terms of the policy by
circuity of action, and the case be as plainly within the policy terms as though the
injured person's suit had been brought against them in the first instance.
14. It has been so held where the assured was caused to pay such a claim as a
result of money withheld from it. United States F.&G. v. Virginia Eng'r Co., Inc., 213
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preclude a third party proceeding by the assured to bring in the
insurer in order to compel it to defend an action in accordance with the
insurer's obligation under the defense coverage clause,' 5 and that an
insurer may not invoke a No-Action clause which provides that no
action will lie until after satisfaction of a judgment against the in-
sured when an adverse judgment has been awarded in an action
defended by the insurance company.' 6
TORTS - Right Of Recovery For Interference With Collection
Of Judgment. James v. Powell, 266 N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 1966).
Plaintiff had obtained judgment for $36,739.35 against Adam Clayton
Powell, Jr. Alleging that Powell and his wife successfully conspired
with two other defendants in the fraudulent conveyance of Puerto
Rican real estate to prevent collection of the judgment, the plaintiff
brought an action for damages against the parties to the transfer. Both
Powells moved to dismiss, contending that since the plaintiff had no
specific interest in the property conveyed, she could complain of no
injury. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division
affirmed, holding that a judgment creditor has a right to recover loss
and expense caused by the tortious interference of a judgment debtor
or third party with collection of the judgment.
In so holding, the court enlarged the remedies available to judg-
ment creditors far beyond those allowed in most states. In the past,
recovery of damages has been permitted, if at all, only when the
creditor has acquired a specific interest in the property prior to the
F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Harder v. Southern Sur. Co., 200 Mo. App. 162, 204 S.W. 34(1918) ; Black Mountain R.R. v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 175 N.C. 566, 96 S.E. 25(1918) (where a judgment was obtained against the assured by the party derivatively
liable); Board of Trade Livery Co. v. Georgia Cas. Co., 160 Minn. 490, 200 N.W. 633(1924) (where a judgment was obtained against a permissive user of the assured's
vehicle, and the policy provided for coverage to such a person). See also Elliott v.
Behner, 150 Kan. 876, 96 P.2d 852 (assured immune against judgment as a govern-
mental agency) ; DeGregerio v. Skinner, 351 Pa. 448, 41 A.2d 653 (1940) ; Govern-
ment Personal Auto. Ass'n v. Hagg, 131 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Contra,
Ayers v. Hartford Acc. Ins. Co., 106 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1939) (insured immune as
a governmental agency) ; Hughes v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 223 Ala. 59, 134
So. 461 (1931) (insured immune as a governmental agency); Gray v. Houck, 167
Tenn. 233, 68 S.W.2d 117 (1934) (unable to obtain service on the insured); Fulle-
glove v. Constitution Indem. Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 463, 237 N.W. 95 (1931), rehearing
denied, 205 Wis. 466, 238 N.W. 289 (1931) (insured could not be served).
15. Dryden v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. Ltd., 138 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1943);
Scott v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 352 Ill. 572, 186 N.E. 176 (1933).
16. Elliott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 100 Neb. 833, 161 N.W. 579 (1917) ; Sanders
v. Frankfort, Maine Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 72 N.H. 485, 57 Atl. 655 (1904);
American Indem. Co. v. Fellbaum, 114 Tex. 127, 263 S.W. 908, 37 A.L.R. 633 (1924).
Contra, Illinois Tunnel Co. v. General Acc. Fid. & Life Ins. Co., 219 Ill. 201 (1920) ;
Emerson v. Western Auto. Indem. Ass'n, 165 Kan. 242, 182 Pac. 647 (1919) ; Fidelity
& Life Co. v. Martin, 163 Ky. 12, 924, 173 S.W. 307 (1915).
In Maryland, this type of clause requiring satisfaction of the judgment by the
assured as a condition precedent to the insurer's liability is now illegal. MD. COD4
ANN. art. 48A, § 481 (1957). Previously, it had been held that the insurer had no
obligation to pay until after the insured had paid such a judgment imposed by law
on it. New York Indem. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 Md. 73, 149 Atl. 855(1930); Louden & Lanchshire Indem. Co. v. Cosgriff, 144 Md. 660, 125 Atd. 259(1924); U.S.F.&G. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289, 125 Atl. 660 (1925); Poe v. Phila.
Cas. Co., 118 Md. 347, 84 Atl. 476 (1912).
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interference.' To the majority, which did not acknowledge a distinc-
tion between secured and unsecured judgments, the issue was whether
provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act2 barred the
plaintiff's cause of action in tort. To the dissenting justices, how-
ever, the primary issue was whether such a cause of action exists,
and the thorough dissenting opinion noted the doubtful applicability
of the precedents cited to support the majority's recognition of a tort
in the case of interference with the collection of an unsecured judg-
ment.' The dissent also pointed out a practical problem in the adminis-
tration of such a right: how, in a case involving more than one un-
secured creditor, could a court determine which creditors suffered loss
and expense as a result of the interference?
If a reasonably precise method of ascertaining and apportioning
creditors' losses can be formulated in future decisions, the court's inno-
vation would appear to be based on sound social policy. The exist-
ence of a tort remedy against debtors and third parties who im-
properly interfere with collection of judgments would likely be a far
more effective deterrent to such interference than the present equitable
remedies available to defrauded creditors.
TRADE REGULATION - Indefiniteness In Fair Trade Con-
tract Prevents Its Enforcement Against Price-Cutting Retailer.
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. T. G. Stores, Inc., 356 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.
1966). Appellant manufacturer sought in this action to enjoin the
appellee, a multipurpose discount retailer, from selling at prices stipu-
lated in appellant's fair trade contract in violation of Maryland's Fair
1. See, e.g., Moody v. Burton, 27 Me. 427 (1847) ; Raymond v. Blancgrass, 36Mont. 449, 93 Pac. 648 (1908); Klous & Co. v. Hennessey, 13 R.I. 332 (1881);
Michaelson v. All, 43 S.C. 459, 21 S.E. 323 (1895) ; Hall v. Eaton, 25 Vt. 457 (1853) ;Field v. Siegel, 99 Wis. 605, 75 N.W. 397 (1898). See also Findlay v. McAllister,
113 U.S. 104 (1885); Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 407 (1860); Kimball v.
Harman, 34 Md. 407 (1871). But see Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460 (N.D. Cal.1921); Nowski v. Siedlecki, 83 Conn. 109, 75 Atl. 135 (1910); Mott v. Danforth,
6 Watts 304 (Pa. 1837).
2. N.Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 278 provides:
1. Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such
creditor, when his claim has matured, may ...(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the
extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon
the property conveyed.
The section is identical with the UNIVORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT § 9(1). The
court held that the statute did not restrict the common law remedies of a creditor.
3. Regarding Quinby v. Strauss, 90 N.Y. 664 (1882), the only New Yorkdecision cited by the majority to support its statement that a tort action for inter-
ference "is undoubtedly part of the law of this state," it has been said: "The case ...is so meagerly reported that it is impossible to determine what was decided .. "
Braem v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 6 N.Y.S. 846, 849 (Sup. Ct. 1889). A later case,
noted in the James dissent, pointed out that the principle announced in Quinby wasdictum. Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 31 N.Y.S. 25, 28 (Com. P1. 1894). The case cited asprecedent for the majority's observation that, "The right of action [in tort] has been
recognized and discussed at length by the United States Supreme Court," in fact
concerned interference with property on which execution had already been made. See
Findlay v. McAllister, 113 U.S. 104, 115 (1885).
[VOL. XXVI
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Trade Law.' The appellee's defense was that the appellant, in attempt-
ing to create an exemption in favor of "fleet operators," had not suffi-
ciently defined the term "fleet operators," and, that if an injunction were
granted, the appellee would be placed in jeopardy of violating the
injunction unintentionally and would therefore be guilty of an unwitting
contempt of court. The Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit accepted
this defense and denied the injunction. The court weighed heavily
evidence that the appellant had changed the contractual definition of
the controverted term in its 1963 contract. 2  The court was also
influenced by the utter confusion of the appellant's own employees in
their attempts to properly classify certain customers as either "fleet
operators" or "ultimate consumers". The court added that, even if
there was a clear meaning of the term among trained specialists in the
trade, the contract would still have been unenforceable against a diver-
sified retailer. The court reasoned that such a retailer could not reason-
ably be expected to understand, obey and apply the term in its business
dealings.
Fair trade acts permit manufacturers, who properly designate
and communicate which of their products are to be fair traded, to stipu-
late minimum retail prices below which such articles may not be sold.3
The purpose of such price maintenance is primarily to preserve the
1. MD. CoD ANN. art. 83, §§ 102-10 (1957).
2. Under the appellant's 1961 fair trade contract, the term "fleet operator" was
defined as "an account which has a suitably equipped workshop having facilities for
the repair and maintenance of motor vehicles and engines, and employing at least one
qualified mechanic devoting his full time to servicing and repairing its vehicles and
engines." In the 1963 contract, all of these requirements were deleted and the contract
provided only: "the term 'fleet operator' refers to the operator of a fleet of motor
vehicles purchasing spark plugs for use in its own equipment only, and not for resale."
But see Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors, Inc., 118 F. Supp.
541 (E.D. Ark. 1954), where the defendant asserted that an exemption "that this
contract shall not apply to consumers buying for industrial or fleet use" was so vague
and indefinite as to render the contract unenforceable. The court rejected this con-
tention by finding that the quoted phrase had for many years a definite meaning in the
trade: namely, "a sale to a purchaser for installation in his own equipment, the custo-
mer maintaining regular facilities for such installation." 118 F. Supp. at 546.
3. Such acts are not in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964)
or Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-44 (1964), because of two amendments which legalize
vertical price-fixing: McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)2 (1964) and the Miller-Tydings
Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 (1964).
Vertical price-fixing occurs when parties at different levels in the distribution
channels, who are not selling to the same buyers, establish agreed selling prices.
Horizontal price-fixing occurs when parties, at the same level in the distribution
channel or at different levels but selling to the same buyers, combine to set prices.
Defendant retailers have attacked the legality of fair trade contracts where the manu-
facturer and retailer have been shown to be selling to the same consumer and there-
fore in competition with each other. The contracts in such cases are illegal and void
because horizontal price-fixing is taking place. The leading case of Esso Standard Oil
Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1957), sets forth the principle that when
a manufacturer and retailer are in competition with respect to some sales, the con-
tract is unenforceable with respect to all sales by the retailer, both those to consumers
to whom the manufacturer is also selling and those to whom he is not.
In Upjohn Co. v. Vineland Discount Health and Vitamin Center, Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 191 (D.N.J. 1964), the New Jersey District Court extended the above doc-
trine when it denied an injunction to a manufacturer who sold fair trade drugs to
hospitals, physicians, and industries employing physicians; the manufacturer sold to
these parties for "promotional purposes only." The court held that such sales, regard-
less of the motivation for them, constituted competition with the retailer and ren-
dered the contract void as against the defendant.
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good will of the particular products. A fair trade contract binds all
retailers who choose to sell the fair-traded product. The constitu-
tionality of this "non-signer" aspect of fair trade legislation has been
often questioned and generally upheld.' Other fair-trading retailers, as
well as the manufacturer, can enforce fair trade contracts against price-
cutters. The enforcement of such contracts has become increasingly
difficult as more and more defenses have been recognized and accepted
by the courts. The courts recognize that fair trade laws are in deroga-
tion of the common law principle that a seller should market his goods
for whatever price he chooses, and it is said that for this reason
enforcement has been and will continue to be curtailed. Specifically,
the courts have hindered enforcement by the adoption of a rule that
requires "reasonable diligence" to be exercised by the manufacturer in
its policing program. Fair trade manufacturers have become saddled
with a burden, therefore, which requires them to maintain costly
systems designed to detect price-cutting and to warn such violators
and, if such warnings go unheeded, to bring legal action. In a Mary-
land case, the court, in granting a manufacturer an injunction, held that
the facts of each case determine whether the requisite "reasonable
diligence" has been exercised.5 The tenuous dividing line between the
exercise and failure to exercise reasonable diligence is at once apparent,
and this uncertainty has created great consternation among fair-trading
manufacturers who wonder whether their policing programs are ade-
quate enough to insure enforcement. 6
The principle case is consistent with the general trend of decisions
vitiating the effectiveness of the fair trade laws, and it also serves as
a caveat to the draftsmen of fair trade agreements who must now
strive more conscientiously for clarity. Moreover, the relatively recent
creation and rapid growth of the multipurpose discount form of
retailing makes it a virtual certainty that this new burden will play an
increasingly important role in fair trade enforcement in the future.7
4. See 25 MD. L. Rg;v. 82 (1965) for a compendium of authorities which sustain
the validity of non-signer provisions of fair trade agreements.
5. In Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 186 Md. 210, 46 A.2d
101 (1946), a retail book seller sought to enjoin a retail department store. The
defense raised was that other retailers were violating the contract and that therefore
the manufacturer had waived or abandoned any and all rights conferred by statute.
The court found that "reasonable diligence" had been exercised and granted the
injunction.
6. See 12 PRAc. LAW 25 (1966).
7. See generally 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPtTITION AND TRADX MARKS 24.3(c)
and (d) (1950) ; TAD4 Rw. Rep. 6374.
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